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Abstract 
While discussion on corruption in sport is intensifying and football match-fixing in particular 
is attracting increasing attention, new fixing scandals emerge offering new accounts of actors 
and corrupt practices within the football industry and the level of the external threat to the 
sport. The scandal exposure of fixed matches in Turkey in 2011sheds light on the fixing of 17 
matches played in the 2010/11 football season and allowed for insights to the actors, structure 
and processes behind the fix. Following four criminal and seven disciplinary proceedings, the 
case is still pending appeal for its final decision, involving a total of 93 suspects and having 
already resulted in the exclusion of two teams from European competitions. The evidence 
collected by the authorities points towards a hierarchical criminal organisation led by the 
President of a football club that arranged and coordinated the fixing in order for his team to 
win the national Championship. The aim of this article is to provide an account of the 
organisation and coordination of match-fixing in Turkey, with its actors, specifics and 
criminal characteristics, while offering an examination of match-fixing for sporting success, 
the least documented type of match-fixing.  
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Introduction 
The last ten years have seen the discussion on corruption in sport intensifying, as more 
incidents of corrupt and fraudulent actions within a number of sports have emerged. High 
profile incidents have uncovered the frequency and intensity of corruption, especially in 
professionalised competitive sports, such as football (Hill, 2010; 2015; Haberfeld and 
Sheehan, 2013; Brooks et al., 2013; Manoli et al., 2017) and athletics (O'Leary, 2013). In the 
latter, a number of widely documented scandals of athletes’ doping have recently surfaced, 
triggering further investigations into the anti-doping test regime before and during major 
events, such as the Olympics, and even resulting in athletes being stripped off their medals 
and banned from participating in future competitions (Dijkstra, et al., 2016; Fincoeur et al., 
2014; Paoli and Donati, 2014). Corruption in football has attracted equal, if not more, 
attention in recent years, with prominent scandals of bribery involving high level officials 
(e.g. FIFA, see Jennings, 2016) and cases of match-fixing in specific national contexts (e.g. 
Italy, see Di Ronco & Lavorgna, 2015; Greece, see Manoli and Antonopoulos, 2015; Manoli 
et al., 2017; the Netherlands, see Spapens and Olfers, 2015; Poland, Portugal and Brazil, see 
European Commission, 2012; Germany, see Feltes, 2013; Haberfeld and Sheehan, 2013) 
surfacing over and over again. 
 While, as recent scandals have demonstrated, corruption in sport can take many forms, 
match-fixing in football tends to attract the attention of both media and high profile 
individuals such as Ralf Mutschke, FIFA’s head of security, who suggested that organised 
crime structures “recently switched from drug trafficking to match-fixing” (Mutschke 2013: 
ix-x). In his study of match-fixing in Belgian football, Declan Hill (2010) appears to be in 
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agreement with Mutschke’s statement, presenting a hierarchical, mafia-type structure within 
football that organises and manages the manipulation of matches on the basis of profit 
through gambling. On the other hand, Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015), through a detailed 
account of football match-fixing in Greece, describe a flat, web-type structure, formed 
through both long-term and short-term agreements made on the basis of either promise of 
reward or threat of harm. These entirely different organisational structures and incentives 
already captured within academia can allow us to suggest that match-fixing and its details can 
indeed take diverse forms and thus be manifested in various ways. Moreover, of interest are 
the accounts on the level of infiltration of ‘organised crime’ in football as this is manifested –
among other- by match-fixing. In September 2012, for instance, an EU-parliament special 
committee on ‘Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering’ pointed out that “sports 
fraud is extremely interesting for organized crime due to its relatively high revenues and low 
sentences”…[criminal organizations have] “deeply penetrated the football establishment”. 
(Fajon and Bozkurt, 2012 cited in Feltes, 2013: 25). In addition, it was suggested during the 
hearings of the committee that “strong ties exist between the football establishment and 
criminal organizations especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. …Criminals have 
infiltrated in the clubs and federations and are operating from within, while using the clubs 
as covers for a multitude of criminal activities” (Fajon and Bozkurt, 2012 cited in Feltes, 
2013: 25). 
 However, and despite the attention match-fixing cases have attracted, academic 
research on the matter is still in its infancy. In fact, one could argue that the only theoretical 
frameworks available on match-fixing actors and processes come from the two above 
mentioned cases: Belgian football by Hill (2009) and Greek football by Manoli and 
Antonopoulos (2015), which were also considered for this study. This paper examines one of 
the most prominent cases of match-fixing in European football, the match-fixing case of 
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Turkish football, often referred to as ‘Şike Davası’, in an attempt to further our understanding 
of the match-fixing phenomenon and its various manifestations, as well as the level of 
infiltration of organised crime in football. In particular, the case examined is considered one 
of the biggest scandals in Turkish football, involving 93 prominent figures of the sport. 
Following the investigation of the Turkish police during the 2010/11 season, 31 of these 
individuals were imprisoned, due to their fixing related activities, initiating a number of legal 
battles. Rather than fixing for financial gains through betting, which has been a dominant 
theme of academic work in the field (Hill 2009; 2010; Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015), the 
case offers an appropriate context to examine match-fixing for sporting success. Fixing for 
sporting success refers to the manipulation of the outcome of football matches in order for the 
overall competition/league to be won, and by extension for the financial benefits associated 
with that success (e.g. from participation in Champions’ League, sponsors, etc.) to be 
obtained (Carpenter, 2014). This study hence adds to the limited academic work on match-
fixing for sporting success, while offering a detailed account of the previously undocumented 
process of match-fixing in Turkey with its actors, specifics and criminal characteristics. In 
more detail, the analysis of the case focuses on the primary actors of a scheme, described in 
the criminal proceedings before the Turkish court, which comprised of several key 
individuals from one of Turkey’s leading clubs, Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü (hereafter 
‘Fenerbahçe’) and their match-fixing activities of specific games of the Turkish Super 
League (the Turkish first national football division, known as ‘Süper Lig’) during the second 
half of the 2010/2011 football season. It is also important to note that this paper does not aim 
to explain the political dimension of the Turkish match-fixing case, which has been already 
analysed in great detail albeit within the country (Başaran, 2013; Erkin, 2015; Uzun, 2015).  
 The paper procceds in four steps. Firstly, the overview of the case elaborating on the 
background and the subsequent legal and disciplinary proceedings is presented, with a view 
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to provide a contextual setting for the analysis in the following sections. After the 
methodological approach adopted and the data used for the analysis are outlined, the process 
of match-fixing in Turkey is presented, followed by an examination of all key actors involved, 
including both the primary actors of the alleged ‘criminal organisation’ and the associated 
secondary actors. Finally, a discussion takes place in order to better contextualise the findings 
of this study.  
 
Overview of the Turkish Match-fixing Case 
The Turkish match-fixing case is one of the most prolific and scandalous events that has 
taken place in the history of football in Turkey, which was classed as the 28th best in the 
FIFA world ranking at the time when the scandal broke (FIFA, 2017). The case was the result 
of an eight-month investigation (December 2010 to July 2011) by the Turkish authorities that 
involved wiretapping and technical and physical tracking of several individuals, who were 
suspected to form ‘criminal organisations’ to conduct match-fixing activities in the top two 
divisions of Turkish football, the Turkish Super League and the First League (known as ‘1. 
Lig’). A total of 17 matches played in the 2010/11 football season were suspected of being 
manipulated including 13 of the Turkish Super League and the final of the Turkish Cup (see 
Table 1). Consequently, on July 3rd 2011, the Turkish police ran concurrent operations in 15 
different cities, making several arrests which marked the commencement of the criminal 
proceedings that involved a total of 93 suspects. Following police interrogations,  31 of 93 
suspects were arrested and sent to prison. Among them were individuals from prominent 
Turkish Super League clubs including several executives of Fenerbahçe, namely its President, 
two Vice-Presidents, an Executive Committee member, the Director of Finance, and the 
Director of Youth Divisions; the head coach and the Executive Committee Member of 
Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü (hereafter ‘Beşiktaş’); the President and a player (goalkeeper) of 
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Sivasspor Kulübü (hereafter ‘Sivasspor’); the head coach and a player (striker) of 
Eskişehirspor Kulübü (hereafter ‘Eskişehirspor’); and two players (strikers) of Istanbul 
Büyükşehir Belediyespor (‘IBB’, currently known as ‘Basaksehirspor’).  
Table 1. The list of games that were the subject of match-fixing activities during the 
2010/2011 season in Turkish football. 
 
Games Date 
 
Division 
 
1. Manisaspor v Trabzonspor 
2. Fenerbahçe v Kasımpaşa 
3. Bursaspor v Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyespor  
4. Gençlerbirliği v Fenerbahçe 
5. Gençlerbirliği v Trabzonspor 
6. Eskişehirspor v Fenerbahçe 
7. Trabzonspor v Bursaspor 
8. Eskişehirspor v Trabzonspor 
9. Fenerbahçe v Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyespor  
10. Karabükspor v Fenerbahçe 
11. Fenerbahçe v Ankaragücü 
12. Trabzonspor v Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyespor  
13. Sivasspor v Fenerbahçe 
14. Beşiktaş v Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyespor 
15. Diyarbakırspor v Giresunspor 
16. Karşıyakaspor v Giresunspor 
17. Giresunspor v Mersin Idmanyurdu 
 
21.02.2011 
26.02.2011 
06.03.2011 
07.03.2011 
20.03.2011 
09.04.2011 
17.04.2011 
22.04.2011 
01.05.2011 
08.05.2011 
15.05.2011 
15.05.2011 
22.05.2011 
15.05.2011 
04.04.2011 
18.04.2011 
30.04.2011 
 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Super League 
Turkish Cup 
First League 
First League 
First League 
 
 
The criminal indictment presented by the Turkish public prosecutor (Indictment No:2011/598) 
accused the suspects of two distinctive criminal offences that are established under different 
legislations. First, the public prosecutor alleged that there were activities that involved both 
match-fixing (‘şike’ in Turkish) and the payment of incentive bonuses (‘teşvik primi’ in 
Turkish), which are criminal offences related to the manipulation of the results of the matches 
under section 11 of Legislation 6222 on Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sport, which 
came into force on April 14th 2011. Second, certain suspects were also alleged to be involved 
in the formation and activities of ‘criminal organisations’, defined as an offence under 
Section 220 of the Turkish Penal Code. Section 220 of the Turkish Penal Code defines the 
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characteristics of a ‘criminal organisation’: firstly, the presence of (at least) three persons, 
who come together with an intention to engage in criminal activity.  Secondly, a ‘criminal 
organisation’ is a hierarchical entity. The existence of hierarchy necessitates a ‘leader’, who 
provides directives and orders, and ‘members’ who act upon them. Finally, there needs to be 
continuity in the relationship among the members of the organisation.  
This distinction between criminal offences under the Turkish law is important in order 
for one to understand the conviction of the case’s individuals. Whilst some of the suspects 
were later convicted by the courts for both the offences of Legislation 6222, i.e., match-fixing 
and the payment of incentive bonuses, and section 220 of the Turkish Penal Code, i.e., 
establishing or being member of a ‘criminal organisation’, others were convicted of only one 
criminal offence either under Legislation 6222 or section 220 of the Turkish Penal Code. In 
particular, the President of Fenerbahçe was accused of establishing and running a criminal 
organisation composed of both officials of the Club and other actors to manipulate the results 
of certain matches in order for his club to win the 2010/11 Turkish Super League 
Championship, which the Club eventually won in the last week of the season. Alleged 
manipulation involved fixing activities by monetarily rewarding a number of the opponents’ 
players, coaches and team administrators to underperform against Fenerbahçe, and offering 
payment of incentive bonuses to perform well against Trabzonspor Kulübü (hereafter 
‘Trabzonspor’), the main rival of Fenerbahçe and an eventual runner-up for the 
Championship of that season. At the same time, players, match officials and presidents of 
opposing teams, who accepted money to participate in the fixing of matches, were accused of 
match-fixing and the payment/receipt of incentive bonuses, under section 11 of Legislation 
6222 on Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sport, but were not accused of involvement 
in organised crime activities.  
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 Subsequent proceedings of the case have involved criminal lawsuits before the 
Turkish courts. The original criminal proceedings were before the 16th High Criminal Court 
of Istanbul, a special-authorised state court1, and its judgment (Judgment No: 2012/71) was 
delivered during the 23rd hearing on July 2nd 2012. The court convicted 47 suspects, including 
the President and the officials of Fenerbahçe, and the head coach and an Executive 
Committee member of Beşiktaş, for offences under Legislation 6222 and section 220 of the 
Turkish Panel Code, and acquitted 46 suspects. Subsequently, both the convicted individuals 
and the public prosecutor appealed against the judgment before the Turkish Supreme Court 
(5th Criminal Division) which delivered its decision (Judgment No: 2014/516) on January 
17th 2014. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the President and the one of the 
Vice-President of Fenerbahçe but quashed the convictions of 31 individuals on the grounds 
of procedural irregularities related to the Legislation of Criminal Procedural Rules. The 
Supreme Court also ordered the re-trial of those 31 individuals and appointed the 13th High 
Criminal Court in Istanbul2 for the re-trial procedings as the special-authorised state courts 
were abolished in Turkey on March 6th 2014. Meanwhile, the individuals whose convictions 
were upheld requested a stay of execution and a re-trial  as well, both of which were accepted 
by the 13th High Criminal Court effectively allowing them to join the proceedings that 
commenced on January 13th 2015. The 13th High Criminal Court acquitted all defendants 
during the 6th hearing on October 9th 2015 (Judgment No: 2015/212). In relation to the 
offences of Legislation 6222, match-fixing and the incentive bonus payments, the reasoning 
by the Court was based on the illegality and inadmissibility of evidence that was gathered by 
the Turkish authorities rather than the examination of actual offences. Because the 
wiretapping and physical tracking by the Turkish police were initiated in December 2010 
                                                 
1 The 16th High Criminal Court was a special-authorised state court, ‘özel yetkili mahkeme’, established by 
Legislation 5190 in 2004 to replace specialist courts to trial individuals that committed terrorism-related 
offences. 
2 The 13th High Criminal Court differs from the 16th High Criminal Court of Istanbul as it is a criminal court not 
a special-authorised court. 
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prior to Legislation 6222 coming into force (in April 2011), according to the Court, the 
wiretaps and other physical evidences were not legally obtained by the court order and used 
to construe offences that legally did not exist, thus rendering the evidence inadmissible 
((Judgment No: 2015/212, pp. 250-53). The Court also concluded that the illegality and 
inadmissibility were applicable even after Legislation 6222 came in force, and therefore there 
was a lack of legitimate evidence to prove the offences of match-fixing and incentive 
payments (Judgment No: 2015/212, p.251 and 272) while ordering for all evidence obtained 
by the Turkish authorities to be destroyed (Judgment No: 2015/212, p.305). This judgment is 
currently subject to a pending appeal before the Supreme Court (5th Criminal Division). 
 The criminal proceedings of the Turkish courts have had ramifications not only for 
the individuals relating to the case but also for the affiliated clubs. Both the Turkish Football 
Federation (TFF) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) initiated 
disciplinary investigations following the arrests made by Turkish authorities in July 2011. 
Firstly, the TFF, on August 24th 2011, withdrew Fenerbahçe from participating in the 
2011/12 UEFA Champions League competition and allowed Trabzonspor, the runner up for 
that season, to participate in the competition instead. The TFF Professional Football 
Disciplinary Committee (PFDC) also initiated disciplinary proceedings against 16 Turkish 
Super League clubs and individuals that were alleged to be involved in match-fixing 
activities in the indictment and, on May 6th 2012, a total of 10 individuals were sanctioned 
with various bans from football-related activities. Amongst them were the Vice-Presidents 
and the Youth Divisions Director of Fenerbahçe, a board member of Sivasspor, a player 
(striker) of IBB and a player (striker) of Eskişehirspor (PFDC, 2012). The appeals of these 
individuals were also rejected by the TFF Board of Appeals on June 4th 2012 (TFF, 2012). 
Meanwhile, UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary Body (CDB), which had closely monitored 
both the criminal proceedings before the Istanbul 16th High Criminal Court and the TFF’s 
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disciplinary proceedings, sanctioned both Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş due to the involvement of 
their club officials in match-fixing activities (UEFA, 2013a). Fenerbahçe was excluded from 
participating in the next three UEFA club competitions (2013/2014, 2014/2015, and 
2015/2016 seasons) for which they would qualify, whilst Beşiktaş was excluded from 
participating in the UEFA Europa League 2013/14, which the Club had already qualified for. 
Both clubs appealed against these decisions with the UEFA Appeals Body rejecting Beşiktaş’ 
appeal and reducing the exclusion period of Fenerbahçe from UEFA club competitions to 
two years (2013/2014, 2014/2015 seasons), and deferring the third season for a probationary 
period of five years (UEFA, 2013b). Both clubs also appealed to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (hereafter CAS), but the decisions of UEFA’s Appeals Body were upheld as the CAS 
panels were adamant that the officials of both clubs conducted or attempted to conduct 
match-fixing activities (CAS 2013/A/3256 & CAS 2013/A/3258).  
Data and Methods 
The article is based on a variety of sources of data of a similar nature. Specifically, an 
analysis of the official legal files of four criminal and seven disciplinary proceedings was 
conducted. In more detail, our analysis focused on the Indictment of the Public Prosecutor of 
Istanbul (No. 2011/598), the proceedings before the Istanbul 16th High Criminal Court (No. 
2012/71), the appeal proceedings before the Turkish Supreme Court (5th Criminal Division – 
No. 214/516), the re-trial before the Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court (State Court – No. 
2015/212), the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Turkish Football Federation (TFF – 
No. 111), the two disciplinary proceedings by UEFA (2013a and 2013b) and the four 
arbitration proceedings before the CAS (CAS - 2013/A/3256, 2013/A/3258, 2015/A/4345 
and 2015/A/4347). These proceedings contain the Turkish police’s initial investigation 
findings, which include excerpts from wiretapped conversations, physical recordings, 
photographic evidence and ample details on the processes and actors of the match-fixing case. 
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The main limitation of this study is that the legal files used in this research, and in particular 
the evidence they contain, are the result of law enforcement activity, which in turn is the 
result of resource restrictions, the competency of agents, organizational priorities, and wider 
political priorities (see Kinzig 2004).  
 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
The process of match-fixing 
A clear and well organised four step process was followed in order for the above mentioned 
matches to be fixed. The steps included in the process, as well as its peculiarities will be 
discussed below.  
 
1. Initial meeting – match selection 
As described within the legal files, the first step in the process of match-fixing was a meeting, 
between three individuals, the President and the Vice-Presidents of Fenerbahçe, which was 
mostly held in the training ground of the club. In this initial meeting, key topics were 
discussed, such as which games needed to be fixed, the possibility to manipulate their result 
and the level of payment to be offered. The matches selected fall under two categories; firstly, 
matches of Fenerbahçe with competitive balance between the team and its opponent; and 
secondly, matches with competitive balance between the runner-up teams for the 
Championship title and their opponents. Competitive balance, the premise that sporting 
contests must contain elements of unpredictability and thus an uncertain outcome, is a central 
element to any sporting contest (Freestone & Manoli, 2017). In both categories of matches, 
the existence of a high unpredictability of the result and the subsequent effect its outcome 
12 
 
would have on the final ranking of the league table were the main criteria for the selection of 
particular matches to manipulate.  
At this initial meeting, an agreement would be reached on the plan of action to follow 
in order for the desired results to be achieved, which actors of the ‘organisation’ to involve in 
the process of fixing the games, and who to initially approach in the opposion team. 
Determining the selection of particular actors for the match-fixing process mostly depended 
upon the actors’ ability and the extent of their network to enable the set-up of the fixing, in 
particular accessing the individuals of the opposition and carrying out the negotiations. 
Therefore, considering the convictions, although all actors of the ‘organisation’ were charged 
with the offence of organised crime under section 220 of the Turkish Penal Code, their 
convictions for the offences of match-fixing and incentive payments under Legislation 6222 
were not related to all 13 games, but only to those games where their direct involvement in 
conducting activities of fixing or attempting the fix was proven. 
 
2. Setting up & Gaining access 
Following the initial meeting, the second step of the process involved communicating the 
plan of action to fix a particular game and the level of payments to be offered in return to the 
selected actors for each match. Generally, the officials of Fenerbahçe were the first to be 
contacted and informed about the plans. Then, the other selected actors were contacted and 
informed to commence the accessing the individuals in the opposition, i.e. players, coaches or 
team administrators. The above line of action is clearly illustrated in the fixing process of the 
match against Ankaragücü on May 15th 2011. It was the President who first instructed one of 
the Vice-Presidents to arrange the manupilation of the game, who then contacted the Director 
of Youth Divisions to commence the fixing activities (Indictment No:2011/598 p. 337, 
Judgment No: 2012/71, p.83). What is also important to note at this stage is that, since match-
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fixing was organised for the purposes of sporting success, i.e., Fenerbahçe to win the 
Championship, depending on the importance of specific matches in regards to the impact of 
their results on the league standing, the actors of the organisation would be divided into sub-
groups in order to facilitate the access to the individuals of the opponents as soon as possible.  
For instance, for the matches against IBB on May 1st 2011 and Ankaragücü on May 15th 2011 
(Indictment No:2011/598 p. 302 and 337, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.79 and p.84) there were 
two sub-groups in operation conducting match-fixing activities whereas three sub-groups 
worked on the match against Sivasspor (Indictment No:2011/598 p. 371, Judgment No: 
2012/71, pp.86-87). The sub-groups were operating in coordination with each other in order 
to avoid approaching the same individuals. This clear division of tasks and targeted 
individuals can be better illustrated through the following quotes, taken from the wiretapped 
conversations between the President of Fenerbahçe and the two Vice-Presidents, regarding 
the match against IBB on May 1st 2015. In the excerpts,  the President was trying to get an 
update on accessing the player of IBB who was known to the actors because he used to play 
for Fenerbahçe and in one of the matches scored an own goal. 
 
President: How is everything? 
Vice-President 1: Everything is fine, my president. Everybody is in their relevant places…I 
passed your message to all of them. 
P: Him, who scored an own goal? 
VP 1: Hmm, I do not know him, he is not my responsibility. 
P: Is that so? OK then. 
 
The President calls the other Vice-President. 
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President: How is it going? 
Vice-President 2: Good, good, really good. 
P: …today…what did you do with our one who scored an own goal? 
VP 2: Hmm, him, everything fine with him, there is no problem…on Monday…everything is 
fine not to worry.  
(Indictment No:2011/598 p. 313, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.264) 
 
It is worth underlying that while these initial steps followed in this process resemble the 
initial steps in both the Belgian (Hill, 2009) and the Greek (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015) 
case, this highly organised procedure of carefully crafting and managing the division of tasks 
has not been documented before. All actors were in regular contact with the Vice-Presidents, 
informing them about their progress. This effective communication ensured that the activities 
of the sub-groups were coordinated and did not overlap. The actors used their personal 
network to approach the individuals in the opposition teams, making the access to them far 
from problematic. Commonly, the individuals selected were either players that were 
represented by the players’ agents involved, or former players, managers and officials of 
Fenerbahçe who were now working for the opponents. If at any point a challenge appeared in 
penetrating the opposition team due to a possible lack of connections, external individuals 
were approached, for instance a player or a manager who used to either play or work for the 
opposition, in order for their network in the team to be utilised for the required access to be 
gained. The initial contact with these individuals was via phone, either text message or call, 
but followed with a meeting to discuss the details. For instance, in arranging the fix for the 
match against IBB on May 1st 2011, the unlicensed players’ agent of the ‘organisation’ 
contacted a player (striker) of IBB to negotiate the fixing. The player was represented by the 
unlicensed agent and not only gaining access was easy, but also arranging the fix required 
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only two phone calls and an in-person meeting (which took place in a restaurant and was 
physically recorded by the Turkish Police - Indictment No:2011/598 p. 302, Judgment No: 
2012/71, p.362). 
 
3. Negotiating the fix 
Once the access to these actors was achieved, the next stage was to negotiate the fix. 
Negotiations usually took place in meetings held in neutral locations, such as a restaurant or a 
hotel lobby. In the fixing of the match against IBB, arranging the fix involved the 
negotiations between the unlicensed agent and the player, concerning the currency of the 
payment. The initial discussion was in relation to the fee of US$100,000, but then the player 
changed his preference to €100,000 Euro. The said player sent a number of texts to the 
unlicensed agent about this matter, one of which reads: Brother, it is not 100 Dollars but 100 
Euro, that’s what he said:) (Indictment No:2011/598 p. 308, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.364). 
After his request, the following text exchange occurred between the player and the agent: 
 
Player: Brother, have you changed it to €100,000? 
Unlicensed players’ agent: No, I have not spoken yet, I will go there tonight brother:) Late at 
night. 
Player: I do not accept anything else.  
(Indictment No:2011/598 p. 308, Judgment No: 2012/71, pp.364-365) 
 
The negotionations, when a long-term relationship existed between the two members such as 
a player and his representing agent, were often short and relatively brief. For example, when 
the same unlicensed players’ agent mentioned above was asked to access the player 
(goalkeeper) of Sivasspor who happened to be also represented by him. The two met in a 
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restaurant in Istanbul and exchanged phonecalls in order to negotiate the fee of US$300,000 
for fixing (Indictment No:2011/598 pp. 393-394, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.492).  
In some occasions the individuals approached (e.g. player, manager or team 
administator) refused to get involved in match-fixing, despite efforts to convince them. On 
these occasions, the unsuccessful actors would re-start the process by trying to access other 
individuals within the opposition teams. In essence, under Legislation 6222, once there is an 
agreement between the actors in place to manipulate a match, the offence of match-fixing is 
committed; whether the desired result the game is achieved is secondary and not taken into 
consideration. If the negotiations failed, i.e., players did not agree to the offer of fixing, or 
rejected it, then, it is still an offence but classed as ‘attempted’ under the Legislation.  
The importance of dividing the organisation into multiple sub-groups for crucial 
games and approaching different individuals of the opponents simultaneously, thus increasing 
the possibility of the fix, illustrates the sophistication of the process followed, that involved 
taking into consideration the possibility that the negotiations might not reach an agreement. 
This well-organised approach does not resemble either the Belgian (Hill, 2009) or the Greek 
(Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015) case, which followed a less methodical and more 
spontanteous process.  
It is important to note that within the legal files there exists no suggestion of any 
evidence of use of any threats or force to convince anyone to participate in match-fixing 
activities, unlike the above mentioned similar match-fixing cases. It is also worth underlining 
that the legal files do not specify any additional activities by the actors before or during the 
matches, such as the arrangement and coordination of the referees or interventions into the 
dressing rooms during half-time, specifically aiming to ensure the desired result is achieved. 
Nevertheless, considering that Fenerbahçe won all the matches that were subject to match-
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fixing activities, it can be assumed that the actors were successful in their efforts of 
manipulating the matches that they targetted.  
 
4. Post-fix payments 
Payments in the overall process of match-fixing were generally made after each game. The 
Finance Director released the agreed payments to the Vice-President, who distributed money 
to the actors involved in the process of match-fixing of each particular match in order to 
make the actual payouts. Neither the President nor the Vice-Presidents ever made any direct 
payments. The amounts of the payouts varied, sometimes significantly. For instance, for the 
match against IBB on May 1st 2011, the player of the opposition was offered and paid 
€100,000 (Indictment No:2011/598 p.303, Judgment No: 2012/71, pp.79-80). US$400,000 
was on offer for the Ankaragücü match and money was distributed to the two sub-groups that 
were working on the fixing of the game. Eventually, only US$200,000 was paid to the 
individuals who agreed to participate in match-fixing activities, and the remaining 
US$200,000 was returned (Indictment No:2011/598 p.337, Judgment No: 2012/71, pp. 83-
84). Both the €100,000 that went to the striker of IBB and the US$100,000 used for the 
Ankaragücü match were subsequently secured by the Turkish Police (Indictment 
No:2011/598 p.306 & 340, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.79 & p.84). For the Sivasspor match, on 
the other hand, 400,000 Turkish Lira was offered and paid to the club (Indictment 
No:2011/598 p.372 Judgment No: 2012/71, p.87). All payments had been made in neutral 
locations. 
 
Case peculiarities 
One of the most peculiar and interesting aspects of the football match-fixing process in 
Turkey was the transfer promise made to some of the players of opposing teams as an 
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incentive to participate in the fixing. This previously undocumented activity can be described 
as ‘fixing through the promise of transfer’ and it was based upon the exploitation of the 
position of Fenerbahçe as a club at the apex of Turkish football. Since playing for the Club is 
highly desirable to many players in Turkey, it was used as leverage in the process of fixing. 
The promise of a transfer or the expression of interest by the Club was communicated to 
some of these important players in opposition teams or to their representatives, in order to 
manipulate the players’ phychological state. What is important to note is that the transfer 
promise was made right before a match, in order for the overall strategy of manimulating the 
phychological state of the players to work. For example, before the games against 
Eskişehirspor on April 9th 2011 and Karabükspor on May 9th 2011, the lawyer who worked 
for Fenerbahçe approached the player of Eskişehirspor and the representative of the player of 
Karabükspor to discuss their potential transfer to Fenerbahçe (Indictment No:2011/598 
pp.271 and 323-325 and  Judgment No: 2012/71, p.74 and 81). Although the attempt did not 
work with the player of Eskişehirspor, it was effective with the striker of Karabükspor, who 
refused to play against Fenerbahçe blaiming his injury sustained in the match a week before.3 
 The overall match-fixing process has some particular characteristics that are worth 
highlighting (Indictment No. 2011/598 pp.186-191, Judgment No. 2012/71, pp.57-62). Firstly, 
particular measures were taken to avoid detection by the Turkish authorities. For example, 
mobile phone conversations were very brief and essentially limited to making arrangements 
for further communication in more secure settings. The specifics of fixing activities were 
discussed in the calls from landline numbers, which are more difficult to be wiretapped, or in 
face-to-face meetings. In addition, a particular brand of mobile phones was used, which was 
believed to assist in avoiding wiretapping by the authorities, and, in the case of meetings, 
‘safe’ locations such as the training ground of Fenerbahçe or the business premises of the 
                                                 
3 What is important to note that the player was also eventually signed by Fenerbahçe in the Summer transfer 
window. 
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actors were often preferred. Secondly, during the conversations, the actors used codewords. 
The matches to be fixed were referred to as ‘farm field’, ‘construction’ and ‘court case’, the 
players were called ‘builders’ or ‘defendants’, the President was referred to as ‘the number 
one’ or ‘CEO’, and the acceptance of match-fixing was described as ‘drinking coffee’ 
(Indictment No. 2011/598 pp.190-200, Judgment No. 2012/71, p.61). Thirdly, the payments 
were recorded in Fenerbahçe’s accounts under a specific category of ‘expenses’ that 
disguised their true nature. Often, the payments were classified as repayments of personal 
loans made to the club by the Vice-Presidents or payments for match tickets (Indictment 
No.2011/598 pp.189, Judgment No. 2012/71, p.60).  
 
 
The key actors of match-fixing 
The analysis of the data of the Turkish legal files suggests that a number of individuals were 
involved in the manipulation of matches during the scandal, a number of whom were 
convicted for their involvement and in fact charged for their role in the ‘criminal organisation’ 
of match-fixing that was led by the President of Fenerbahçe. In particular, the criminal 
indictment (No.2011/598, pp.186-191), the decision of the Istanbul 16th High Criminal Court 
(Judgment No. 2012/71, pp.57-62) and the appeal judgment of the Turkish Supreme Court  
(Judgment No. 2014/516, pp. 16-17) all  detailed the structure of this ‘criminal organisation’ 
that conducted match-fixing activities (Figure 1).4  
                                                 
4  The criminal organisation presented in the Figure 1 is constructed through the Turkish legal files and 
composed of individuals who were convicted for their involvement with the organisation by both courts, the 16th 
High Criminal Court in Istanbul and the Turkish Supreme Court (5th Criminal Division). Additionally, although 
the General Manager of Fenerbahçe passed away during the appeal proceedings and, thus, his conviction was 
consequently quashed by the Turkish Supreme Court (5th Criminal Division) (Judgment No. 2014/516, p.36), 
the appeal judgment acknowledged and referenced his role within the organisation (Judgment No. 2014/516, 
p.17).Therefore, his role is also acknowledged within the structure of the organisation in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The structure and the primary actors of the criminal organisation run by the 
President of Fenerbahçe.  
 
Examining the legal files further, while taking the classifications and similar investigations of 
match-fixing processes and actors presented by Hill (2009) and Manoli and Antonopoulos 
(2015) into consideration, the key actors involved in the match-fixing process will be 
discussed below. For the purposes of our analysis, the individuals involved in the 
organisation in question are described as ‘primary actors’ of the case as they were convicted 
of both offences under the Legislation 6222 and section 220 of the Turkish Panel Code. The 
individuals who were convicted for match-fixing activities as per the Legislation 6222 but not 
for involvement with the ‘criminal organisation’ are referred to as ‘secondary actors’ of the 
case. In other words, the conviction for one or both offences is the distinguishing factor 
between the two categories of actors. 
 
Primary Actors 
President of 
Fenerbahçe 
(A.Y)
Vice-President of 
Fenerbahçe 
(I.Y.E)
Vice-President of 
Fenerbahçe
(M.S.M)
Executive Committee Member 
of Fenerbahçe
(A.Y)
Youth Divisions Director of  
Fenerbahçe
(C.T)
Businessman 
affiliated with Sedat 
Peker
(A.K)
Businessman 
affiliated with Sedat 
Peker
(A.B)
Businessman affiliated 
with Sedat Peker
(B.I.I)
Unlicensed 
Players' Agent
(Y.T)
Players' Agent
(D.E)
Executive Committee 
Member of Sivasspor
(A. Ç)
Lawyer of Fenerbahçe
(S.D)
General Manager of 
Fenerbahçe
(S.A)
Director of Finance 
of Fenerbahçe 
(T.Y)
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The primary actors in the Turkish football match-fixing scheme included: 
• The President of Fenerbahçe: The ‘criminal organisation’ was established and led by 
the President of Fenerbahçe. As the leader of the organisation, according to the legal 
files, the President was the key actor making strategic decisions regarding the matches 
to be fixed and the level of payments to be offered in return. Manoli and 
Antonopoulos (2015) consider individuals in this kind of position both the primary 
actors and initiators of the overall match-fixing process, or, according to Hill (2009), 
they are the leaders of the match-fixing ‘organisations’. The President had a 
hierarchical relationship with the members of the organisation, with the characteristics 
of this relationship underlined within the legal files. In more detail, his decisions were 
never questioned by the others and his orders to manipulate the matches were directly 
acted upon despite their criminal nature (Judgment No. 2012/71, p.58, Judgment No. 
2014/516, p. 17). Moreover, payments were released to the members only upon his 
the directives (Judgment No. 2012/71, p.59, Judgment No. 2014/516, p. 17), while the 
President contacted and met primarily with the Vice-Presidents and rarely engaged 
with other co-conspirators (Judgment No. 2012/71, p.59, Judgment No: 2014/516, p. 
17), as it was described above in the process of the fixing. 
• The Vice-Presidents of Fenerbahçe: Two Vice-Presidents were close confidants of 
the President, operating directly below him as the seconds-in-command within the 
hierarchy of the organisation. They communicated the orders of the President to 
others within the organisation, coordinated the fixing activities of the group during the 
overall process of match-fixing, and reported back to the President. One of the Vice-
Presidents was also directly responsible for managing the payments that were made in 
return for the fix. In particular, he organised the distribution of money to the others in 
the organisation and coordinated payments to the opponents.  
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• The Finance Director of Fenerbahçe: Working in conjunction with the Vice-
Presidents, the Director of Finance was responsible for releasing payments from the 
accounts of the club to the Vice-President who was in charge of money distribution. 
The Finance Director also recorded all payments made and ensured they were all 
accounted within the books of the club in a manner that disguised their true nature.  
• Other actors of the organisation / Intermediaries: This category of actors within the 
organisation comprises of two distinct groups of individuals. The first group consisted 
of three club officials of Fenerbahçe, operating directly below the Vice-Presidents, a 
member of the Executive Committee who is also the President’s brother, the Club’s 
General Manager and the Director of Youth Divisions. The second group entailed 
people who were not officially affiliated with the Club and included three 
businessmen, the Executive Committee Member of Sivasspor, a lawyer that was 
handling some of the legal work of Fenerbahçe, an unlicensed players’ agent and a 
licensed players’ agent. These actors were named as ‘facilitators’ by Manoli and 
Antonopoulos (2015), whilst Hill (2009) classified them as ‘runners’ who facilitate 
access to players, coaches and team administrators of oppositions, and are directly 
involved in negotiations and the delivery of payments during the process of match-
fixing. A key attribute of these individuals was their established experience and 
extended network within Turkish football which was critical in performing their 
duties within the structure of the organisation (Judgment No. 2012/71, p.59, Judgment 
No. 2014/516, p.17). In addition, the businessmen involved in the organisation had 
historically held close links with the prominent Turkish ‘mafia’ leader, Sedat Peker, 
who also ran his own criminal network conducting a variety of criminal activities 
(Judgment No. 2012/71, p.59). Sedat Peker was historically the subject of police 
investigation for the operation of his ‘criminal organisation’ in Turkey and was 
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convicted for a number of criminal offences. The President of Fenerbahçe had ties 
withPeker, while the ‘criminal organisation’ that manipulated the results of 
Fenerbahçe matches includes a number of individuals either directly involved in the 
Peker’s organisation or linked to it (Indictment No:2011/598, pp. 192-200; Judgment 
No: 2012/71, pp. 62-63; Judgment No: 2014/516, p.16). For instance, the 
businessmen who were involved in the ‘criminal organisation’ led by the President of 
Fenerbahçe had direct links with Sedat Peker (see Figure 1). In particular, one of the 
businessmen (B.I.I) was previously investigated (and in fact arrested) for being part of 
Peker’s organisation (Indictment No:2011/598, p. 192; Judgment No: 2012/71, p. 62). 
Additionally, the Club lawyer, who was also part of the ‘criminal organisation’ led by 
the President of Fenerbahçe, also had links with Sedat Peker whom he had 
represented in the past (Indictment No:2011/598, p. 193; Judgment No: 2012/71, p. 
63). Interestingly, and despite Peker’s ties with ‘mafia’ type activites, his connection 
to the Turkish match-fixing case was limited to being used by other members of the 
‘organisation’ indirectly and often unknowingly, primarily for his reputation and his 
intimidation capital (Indictment No:2011/598, p. 193; Judgment No: 2012/71, p. 63). 
A hierarchical relationship existed within each of the two groups of individuals as well. The 
club officials worked closely with the Vice-Presidents assisting them in making strategic 
decisions related to specific activities required in fixing the games, such as who to initially 
contact in the opposition team (specific players, coaches or team administrators) and the way 
of  physical payments to be arranged. The club officials also assisted in deciding which 
members of the organisation would work for the fixing of individual games and often became 
a communication channel between the Vice-Presidents and the other members throughout the 
fixing process, although the Vice-Presidents communicated directly with every member 
involved in the process as well. 
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Secondary Actors 
The secondary actors of the math-fixing process included players, presidents, and club 
officials of opposing teams. The diversity of these actors was potentially due to the fact that 
attempts were made to manipulate the result of a high number of matches and in order to do 
so a high volume of secondary actors were targeted in order for the expected result to be 
achieved. As previously underlined, the secondary actors were not part of the criminal 
organisation directly, and were thus convicted only for match-fixing activities as per 
Legislation 6222 but not for involvement with the ‘criminal organisation’; they nevertheless 
played an active and important role in the overall process of match-fixing.  
 Players were key secondary actors due to their power to manipulate the result of a 
match, with primary actors specifically targeting goalkeepers and strikers. For instance, the 
two strikers of IBB, the striker of Eskişehirspor and the goalkeeper of Sivasspor were all 
approached and eventually agreed to take part in the fixing of respective games and were 
subsequently convicted for math-fixing (Judgment No: 2012/71, pp.580-669). Considering 
that the objective of match-fixing is (initially) sporting, i.e., for Fenerbahçe to win each 
match and eventually the league title, the choice of players (goalkeepers and strikers) was 
logical as they are best positioned to directly influence the result of a match (Indictment No: 
2011/598 pp.190, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.61). The influence these players can have on the 
outcome of a match is best illustrated in the following excerpt of a wiretapped conversation, 
in which the Sivasspor’s striker discusses his performance in the match after its completion.  
 
Striker: What can I do, we made Fenerbahçe the champions and I am going. 
Person X: My son, you should have just headed the ball to score but you kicked it, you do not 
kick. 
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Striker: Why should I score, I did not go there to score…I was there just to be there… 
(Indictment No:2011/598 p. 387, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.483) 
 
The presidents and the club officials of the oppenents were mainly approached to facilitate 
the access to the players. However, they were not the only officials of opponents used in the 
process; the coaching team of an opponent, namely the head coach of Eskişehirspor and his 
assistant were involved, in fixing both the matches of Eskişehirspor and the match against 
Sivasspor (Indictment No:2011/598 pp.276, 283 and 374, Judgment No: 2012/71, p.287, 337 
and 350).  The head coach used to work for Sivasspor and in the past played for Fenerbahçe. 
Therefore, he was personally known by the primary actors who utilised his network to access 
the players in the teams and to fix the games. The primary actors’ ability to reach out an 
exented number of secondary actors in the process underscores the strength of their network 
in Turkish football. 
 
Discussion 
A number of observations can be made on the basis of the data obtained on the Turkish 
match-fixing scandal. Firstly, unlike the relatively recent case of football match-fixing 
scandal in Greece also known as Koriopolis (a pun name on the Italian 
scandal Calciopoli and the Greek word ‘korios’ or phone-tap), which involved match-fixing 
networks with a naturally defined horizontal ‘structure’, with participants on these networks 
many times acting on improvisation, and individuals or small groups forming temporary 
collaborations in order for their shared objective to materialise (Manoli and Antonopoulos, 
2015), in Turkey a different image emerges. Specifically, the business of Turkish match-
fixing points towards a relatively rigid organisation, coordination, hierarchy and so on. The 
perception that the match-fixing structure is a criminal organisation is affected by the 
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involvement of the hierarchical structure that has existed as a legal business, 
i.e., Fenerbahçe, in an illegal scheme.  
Secondly, although we are not in the position to verify the root and nature of the 
relationship between and among the various actors involved in the match-fixing scheme, 
what can be safely argued is that at the core of many of these collaborations lie the legitimate 
business connections that are forged within Fenerbahçe. The club is effectively the context in 
which legal business relationships transform into illegal business relationships, and the 
platform upon which ‘loyalty’ (functional for match-fixing activities and necessary for 
secrecy) is borrowed (von Lampe, 2007). What von Lampe (2007) calls a ‘social microcosm’ 
of illegal entrepreneurs is of critical importance to the success of match-fixers. In contrast to 
other contexts, such as -for instance- Belgium, the primary actors are not ‘foreigners’, the 
‘Others’ (Hill, 2010) but native individuals, who are embedded in the Turkish football 
industry. As such they cannot be perceived as exogenous to the sport industry which are 
trying to infiltrate in order to make profit. Rather they are endogenous individuals who run 
legitimate companies and who would thus have been cleared by relevant Turkish 
Government regulations, such as the Fit and Proper test.5 As a result, a question can be raised 
on the potential introduction of similar Government regulations as regards their applicability 
on such occasions, since, as it is illustrated in this case, match-fixing is not always the 
product of ‘organised criminals’ that infiltrate sport, but rather a criminal activity organised 
by the individuals embedded in the sport. 
When intermediaries, who are not directly related to the Club, are involved in the 
match-fixing process, they allow for the expansion of the reach of the hierarchical structure, 
that is the football club itself. The lack , however, of formal structure and permanence among 
those intermediaries acts as a self-protective mechanism to prevent detection through the 
control of the flow of information about the important, core actors involved in the scheme. As 
we saw, for instance, neither the President nor the Vice-Presidents ever paid those involved 
in match-fixing directly. The embeddedness of the match-fixing actors and process in legal 
                                                 
5 The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons is a government introduced test aiming to prevent corrupt or 
untrustworthy individuals from serving on the board of sporting organisations (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015). 
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businesses (i.e. Fenerbahçe) meant that payments for match-fixing activities were absorbed 
relatively easily in the normal workings of the club. As mentioned earlier, payments to 
individuals involved in match-fixing were recorded under the club accounts as the 
repayments of the club’s personal borrowings from the Vice-President. The case of match-
fixing in Turkey offers yet another example of how legitimate businesses provide for a very 
convenient (and already existing) setting for criminal finances management (see Kleemans 
and van de Bunt, 2008).  
Many of the match-fixing activities described earlier in this article took place within 
the confines of the corporation that is Fenerbahçe, which afforded a relatively low visibility. 
Moreover, many of the match-fixing activities involved actions of numerous individuals and 
departments within the particular football club, resulting in a diffusion of the responsibility 
(see Ruggiero, 1996). The particular case of football match-fixing in Turkey exemplifies the 
blurred boundaries between ‘organised crime’ and ‘corporate crime’. There is an overlap 
between ‘corporate crime’ and ‘organised crime’, making it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to distinguish one from the other. It has been suggested that the two are variants 
of the same type of crime and as such they should be analysed jointly (von Lampe, 2016; van 
Duyne and Block, 1994). In some cases, the ways legitimate corporations, such 
as Fenerbahçe, operate would justify such joint analysis. There is a symbiosis between 
criminal businesses and legitimate corporations exemplified not only by the criminal 
activities in which Fenerbahçe officials/employees were involved in within the confines of 
the legal business but also relevant activities within a criminal network that transcended the 
corporate boundaries of the club. 
Our account on Turkish match-fixing offered elements of the social organisation of 
Turkish match-fixing on the basis of the ‘Şike Davası’ scandal during the 2010/2011 football 
season and highlighted that the phenomenon of match-fixing internationally can take diverse 
forms some of which are potentially yet to be uncovered (see Di Ronco and Lavorgna, 2015). 
Clearly, additional research on the topic is necessary.   
 
 
28 
 
Acknowledgements  
The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers, Georgios Papanicolaou, and 
Klaus von Lampe for their helpful comments on an early draft of this article. The review 
process for this article was handled entirely by the former Editor-in-Chief of Trends in 
Organised Crime, Klaus von Lampe. 
 
Compliance with ethical standards  
Authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. This article does not contain any 
studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.   
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Appeal Judgment of the Turkish Supreme Court (5th Criminal Division), No:214/516 
 
Başaran, K (2013)  Arkadan Müdahale 3 Temmuz Şike Davası. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları 
 
Brooks, G., Aleem, A., & Button, M. (2013). Fraud, corruption and sport. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Carpenter, K. (2014) ‘Match-fixing: Framing the fight-back’. International Centre for Sports 
Security Journal, 2(4), 62-69 
 
CAS 2013/A/3256 Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v. UEFA 
 
CAS 2013/A/3258 Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA 
 
CAS 2015/A/4345 Trabzonspor Sportif Yatirim A.S v. UEFA 
 
CAS 2015/A/4347 Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v. Trabzonspor A.S. and UEFA 
 
Di Ronco, A., & Lavorgna, A. (2015). ‘Fair play? Not so much: Corruption in the Italian 
football’. Trends in Organized Crime, 18(3), 176-195 
 
Dijkstra, H. P., Van Dyk, N., & Schumacher, Y.O. (2016). ‘Can I tell you something? I'm 
doping…’, British Journal of Sports Medicine, 50(9), 510-511. 
 
Erkin, A. (2015)  Sarı Lacivert Öfkeli Adam: Aziz Yıldırım. Istanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi 
 
European Commission (2012) Match-fixing in Sports: A Mapping of Criminal Law 
Provisions in EU27. Brussels: European Commission 
 
Feltes, T. (2013) ‘Match-Fixing in Western Europe’. In Haberfeld, M. and Sheehan, D. (Eds), 
Match-Fixing in International Sports. Existing Processes, Law Enforcement, and Preventive 
Strategies. (pp.15-30) New York: Springer 
 
29 
 
FIFA (2017) Turkey: Men’s Ranking. Available at [http://www.fifa.com/fifa-world-
ranking/associations/association=tur/men/index.html] 
 
Fincoeur, B., van de Ven, K. & Mulrooney, K.J.D. (2014) ‘The symbiotic evolution of anti-
doping and supply chains of doping substances’, Trends in Organised Crime. DOI 
10.1007/s12117-014-9235-7 
Freestone, C. J., & Manoli, A. E. (2017). ‘Financial fair play and competitive balance in the 
Premier League’. Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal, 7(2), 175-196. 
Haberfeld, M. & Sheehan, D. (eds) (2013) Match-Fixing in International Sports: Existing 
Processes, Law Enforcement and Prevention Strategies. New York: Springer 
Hill, D. (2009) ‘How Gambling Corruptors Fix Football Matches’, European Sport 
Management Quarterly, 9(4), 411-432  
 
Hill, D. (2010) The Fix: Soccer and Organised Crime. London: McClelland & Stewart 
 
Hill, D. (2015) ‘Jumping into Fixing’, Trends in Organised Crime, 18(3), 212-228 
 
Indictment of Public Prosecutor of Istanbul, No: 2011/598 
Jennings, A. (2016). The dirty game: Uncovering the scandal at FIFA. London: Arrow Books.  
Judgment of the 16th High Criminal Court of Istanbul, No: 2012/71 
 
Judgment of the 13th High Criminal Court of Istanbul, No: 2015/212 
Kinzig, J. (2004) Die rechtliche Bewältigung von Erscheinungsformen organisierter 
Kriminalität. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot.  
Kleemans, E., and Van de Bunt, H.G. (2008) ‘Organised Crime, Occupations and 
Opportunity’, Global Crime, 9(3), 185-197 
 
Legislation 6222 on Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sport (“6222 Sayili Sporda 
Siddet and Duzensizligin Onlenmesine Iliskin Kanun”) 
 
Legislation 6526 concerning the changes to Fighting with Terrorism Legislation and the 
Criminal Procedure Rules (“6526 sayılı "Terörle Mücadele Kanunu ve Ceza Muhakemesi 
Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun”) 
 
Manoli, A.E. & Antonopoulos, G.A. (2015) ‘The Only Game in Town?’: Football Match-
Fixing in Greece’, Trends in Organised Crime, 18(3), 196-211 
 
Manoli, A. E., Antonopoulos, G. A., & Bairner, A. (2017). ‘The inevitability of corruption in 
Greek football’. Soccer & Society. Early access online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2017.1302936 
30 
 
Mutschke, R. (2013) ‘Preface: match-manipulation by organised crime groups’. In Haberfeld, 
M. & Sheehan, D. (eds) Match-Fixing in International Sports: Existing Processes, Law 
Enforcement and Prevention Strategies. (pp. ix–xiii) New York: Springer 
O'Leary, J. (2013). Drugs & Doping in Sports. London: Routledge 
 
Paoli, L. and Donati, A. (2014) The Sports Doping Market. New York: Springer 
 
Ruggiero, V. (1996) Organised and Corporate Crime in Europe. Aldershot: Dartmouth  
 
Spapens, T. and Olfers, M. (2015) ‘Match-fixing: The Current Discussion in Europe and the 
Case of The Netherlands’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
23(4), 333-358 
 
TFF Professional Football Disciplinary Committee (2012), The decision of meeting no. 111 
on 06.05.2012. Available online from 
http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=246&ftxtID=15123 [Accessed 18.10.2017] 
 
UEFA (2013a), Decisions on Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, Steaua. Available online from 
http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/disciplinary/news/newsid=1967131.html [Accessed 
18.10.2017] 
 
UEFA (2013b), Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe appeal decision. Available online from 
http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/disciplinary/news/newsid=1971905.html [Accessed 
18.10.2017] 
 
Uzun, S. (2015) Baykal Kaseti, Dink Cinayeti ve Diğer Komplolar. Istanbul:Kırmızı Kedi 
Yayınevi 
 
van Duyne, P.C and Block, A. (1994) ‘Organised Cross-Atlantic Crime’, Crime, Law and 
Social Change, 22(2), 127-147 
 
von Lampe, K. (2007) ‘Criminals are not alone: Some observations on the social microcosm 
of illegal entrepreneurs’. In van Duyne, P., Maljevic, A., van Dijck, M., von Lampe, K. and 
Harvey, J. (eds) Crime Business and Crime Money in Europe. (pp.131-156) Nijmegen: Wolf 
Legal Publishers  
 
von Lampe, K. (2016) Organised Crime. Los Angeles, Ca.: Sage 
 
 
 
